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3. India in Climate Change: The View from Tokyo 
Yuka Kobayashi 
This chapter first examines Indo-Japanese relations to place the relationship in a wider 
context, and then moves on to examine how Tokyo views New Delhi in relation to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It introduces the ‘China prism’ and 
‘nuclear lens’, two frameworks that significantly influence Tokyo’s perception of New Delhi. 
As a whole, the chapter argues that with regard to Japanese policy-making on climate change, 
India is viewed both in relation to, and in comparison with, China. India was Tokyo’s 
preferred partner in climate change until 1998, when, following India’s nuclear tests, there 
was a dramatic shift in Tokyo’s perception of India. India was then replaced by China, as the 
‘better partner’ for Tokyo in climate change.  
Indo-Japanese Relations 
India and Japan share many traits that would make them natural partners. They are two of 
Asia’s largest democracies, and are economic powerhouses of Asia, ranked as the second and 
third largest economies, respectively (WTO, 2013). In energy, they are both net-importers of 
fossil fuels and are reliant on imports via their sea lanes of communication (SLOC). The 
importance of their SLOC has been re-enforced thorough the 2008 Indo-Japan Security 
Accord and joint exercises around the Hormuz-Malacca-Sea of Japan axis.i Given these 
factors, one would envision extensive ties between the two countries; however, the 
relationship has been a rather neglected one until the recent decade. This is due to Japan’s 
security interests being focussed on its immediate neighbourhood. The distance between 
India and Japan has led to a relative neglect of Indo-Japan relations.  
Japan has traditionally enjoyed an important cultural relationship with India, one historically 
dating back to the latter’s independence movements. While it is well known that Chinese 
Nationalist revolutionaries such as Sun Yatsen (resident in Japan 1895–1916) and Chiang 
Kaishek (resident in Japan 1905–1911) were exiled in Japan, Indian revolutionaries such as 
Netaji (Subhas Chandra Bose – resident in Japan 1943–1945) and Rash Behari Bose (resident 
in Japan 1915 until his death in 1945) similarly sought refuge in Japan. Pan-Asianism 
emerged as an important concept in Asia before and during WWII and, accordingly, linked 
India and Japan. After the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate (1868), Japan moved from the 
Shogunate system to a constitutional monarchy under the Meiji Emperor. Pan-Asianism 
became a central concept in the direction of the country under the Meiji restoration. The roots 
of Pan-Asianism movement in Japan can be traced back to Kakuzo Okakura’s ‘Ideals of the 
East’ where he argues: ‘Asia is one’ (Okakura, 1904).ii Pan-Asianism was central in the 
writings of Okakura and India’s poet laureate, Rabindranath Tagore, and it is well known that 
the two influenced one another. Furthermore, Japan’s modernization via the Meiji 
Restoration, adoption of Western industrial methods, and victory in the Russo-Japanese war 
(1905), inspired Indian revolutionaries such as Jawaharlal Nehru.iii Thus, Japan’s image in 
India is one of respect and admiration, lasting to this day, and is reflected in the Japanese 
government’s surveys of the Indian population (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 
2013).iv Moreover, India’s presence in Japan is felt in every household. ‘Curry-rice’ has 
become a Japanese national dish after Rash Behari Bose introduced the dish via the 
Nakamuraya restaurant in Tokyo. The restaurant hid the revolutionary who was being 
pursued during his exile in Japan.v  
After WWII, when Japan had lost many of its allies, India was one of the few countries to 
remain sympathetic. India opposed the San Francisco Peace between Japan and the Allied 
Powers after WWII, and signed a separate peace agreement with Japan.vi India’s sympathetic 
position is also reflected in Justice Radhabinod Pal’s opposition to the Tokyo Tribunal 
judgement after Japan’s defeat in WWII. Pal, the Indian representative on the Tokyo 
Tribunal, was the sole judge to oppose the judgement.  India’s sympathies with Japan also 
reach to the civilian level where India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru presented the 
Tokyo’s Ueno Zoo with its first Indian elephant in 1949 to cheer up the Japanese children 
after the War (The Japan Forum, 2007).vii  The elephant was a popular addition to Ueno Zoo, 
and has since become a symbol of Indo-Japanese friendship. This historical background 
brings the two countries together and has carved a special place for Indo-Japanese relations.  
Tokyo’s Perception of New Delhi 
In examining Indo-Japanese relations, certain frameworks of analysis can aid in the 
explanation of the various factors influencing this relationship. The Indo-Japan relationship 
can be viewed through a Realist lens where power and military capabilities take front stage. 
The power balance between the two countries is also influenced by their respective 
relationships with the major players in the region, more specifically the United States and 
China. The US-Japan Security Alliance places Japan under the US security umbrella, and 
US-India relations have also warmed considerably since the end of the Cold War, making the 
US matter in the context of Indo-Japanese relations. Another key player is rising China, 
which has a rather complicated relationship with both India and Japan due to their respective 
territorial disputes and historical relations. However, a Realist lens does not help explain the 
complex dynamics between India and Japan, particularly in a non-traditional security issue 
such as climate change.   
Liberals would place emphasis on economic relations between India and China, evidenced in 
collaborative projects such as the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor project. The strong 
economic relationship between the two countries (in terms of Official Development 
Assistance – ODA – and Foreign Direct Investment – FDI) and the relative importance of the 
economic ministries in policy-making (the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in India and 
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry in Japan) lend some weight to a Liberal 
emphasis. However, this framework does not capture the unique nature of the climate change 
issue.  
Although Realist and Liberal frameworks shed some light on Indo-Japanese relations, they 
require supplementation through a Constructivist approach. Constructivism’s focus on the 
role of identity—ideas, norms, and beliefs—in state behaviour is more suitable for examining 
climate change, a particularly emotive issue. This is firstly due to its linkage to nuclear 
energy, from the Japanese side, and secondly, because of the close nature of Indo-Japanese 
relations. This chapter examines how values and emotions can influence Japan’s assessment 
of India in climate change. I offer two ideational frameworks, specific to the Japan-India 
relationship, that distil the emotive, value considerations Tokyo emphasises in its relations 
with New Delhi: the ‘China prism’ and the ‘nuclear lens’.  
The ‘China Prism’ in Contemporary Indo-Japanese Relations 
Japan has traditionally seen Indian culture through the prism of ‘China’. Buddhism, one of 
the most important religions in Japan, originally came from India via China. However, much 
of Buddhist thought, teaching and iconography was transformed during its travels to Japan.viii 
For example, bongo, a form of writing Sanskrit that is used in Japanese Buddhism has 
changed in interesting ways during its translation from India to Japan via China (van Gulik, 
1956). Thus, with the geographical distance between Japan and India, China served as an 
intermediary, with Japan absorbing these ideals indirectly, as it was transmitted through 
China. In this sense, Japan has historically absorbed aspects of Indian culture via the ‘China 
prism’.  
Although still relevant today, this prism has altered into something that, in some policy 
domains, focuses and defines Japan’s national interest. With the rise of China, Japan views 
India as a partner that can counter-balance this rise, but it also means that the partnership with 
India is often coloured in comparison to, or in consideration with, China.  
In contrast to their extensive cultural ties, political relations between India and Japan only 
date to the mid-nineteenth century. In 1952, India concluded a separate peace agreement with 
Japan following the end of WWII. Nehru refused to attend the San Francisco Peace 
Conference which concluded WWII, signalling that India’s position was more sympathetic to 
Tokyo. India opposed the San Francisco Settlement since it regarded some sections to 
compromise Japan’s sovereignty and independence (Rao, 2009).  
Japan’s Prime Minister, Nobusuke Kishi, visited India in 1957. Nehru’s return visit took 
place later that year, and Japan began its ODA to India in 1958. India relied on Japan’s ODA 
to support its infrastructural development, with the Japan becoming the number one aid donor 
to India (Embassy of Japan in India, 2002). Unfortunately, this special relationship began to 
decline as the Cold War split India and Japan into two camps, with India leaning towards the 
USSR and Japan moving under the US security umbrella. This changed with the end of the 
Cold War and the rise of China, when India became increasingly viewed as a means for Japan 
to counter-balance China. Japan was the rising power in the 1980s, but later experienced an 
economic downturn, while China and India opened up their economies and achieved high 
annual economic development rates in the 1990s and 2000s. In this regard, Japan became a 
declining power, with China and India shifting to become the emerging powers central to the 
balance of power in the Asian region. Against this backdrop, Japan viewed India in 
comparison with China.  
From the early 1990s, India practiced economic reform in order to open up its economy, and 
began to focus its energies on relations with Asia in its ‘Look East Policy’. Japan was 
becoming worried about the rise of China, particularly China’s modernization of the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) and their motivations regarding SLOC and territorial disputes. This 
coincided with an increase in anti-Japanese protests in China over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao 
Islands. These Japanese concerns were affirmed by India who has disputed borders with 
China in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh and the region of Aksai Chin in the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir. 
Politically and economically, India and Japan were natural partners and the post-Cold War 
environment brought the two even closer together. Official and economic exchange between 
the two countries peaked in 1997/98.  For Japan, its immediate neighbourhood was no longer 
just the priority, thus the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) strove to build a stronger presence in India. In the eyes 
of Japan, India was the better partner – a developing economy with low wages that would 
complement Japan’s economy, without the lack of rule of law or enforcement measures, 
which were serious issues in China (Fujita and Hamaguchi, 2006). However, this relationship 
was irrevocably transformed with Pokhran II, India’s nuclear tests in May 1998, which 
brought the nuclear issue to the forefront of the relationship. Japan has been keenly sensitive 
towards nuclear weapons in its international relations and has not been shy in asserting its 
sentiments.  
The ‘Nuclear Lens’ in Contemporary Indo-Japanese Relations  
The China prism is magnified by Japan’s nuclear identity. Because of Japan’s experience of 
the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, and more recently of the nuclear disaster at 
Fukushima in 2011, the Japanese population holds a victimization complex with regard to 
nuclear weapons.ix Furthermore, being the sole victims of nuclear weapons, there is a belief 
that the Japanese have a special prerogative and moral obligation to speak out on matters 
relating to nuclear weapons. At the policy level, this ‘nuclear identity’ becomes something of 
a lens through which matters of foreign policy can be viewed.   
The nuclear issue has a significant impact on Japan-India relations. India conducted a series 
of nuclear tests in May 1998, testing five nuclear devices (Pokhran II). These included an 
atom bomb (15kt fission device), a hydrogen bomb (45kt thermonuclear device) and sub-
kilton device (0.2 kt device), which gave India a nuclear weapons capability (Shankar 
Roychowdhury, cited in Swaminathan, 2003). For India, the tests were a ‘prudent measure of 
future insurance in the military context of China’s four modernizations. China must and will 
remain a permanent factor in our security perceptions’ (Ibid.). After Pokhran II, Japan 
publically condemned India and also gathered support for criticism in other venues such as 
the UN, as I discuss later. Japan suspended all political exchanges and economic assistance 
with India for about three years. In this regard, the nuclear tests were unfortunately timed. 
They were conducted just as the Indian economy was opening up and Japan was shifting its 
focus beyond North East Asia to find partners further afield.  
With the Japanese economy slowing down and China rising in the late 1990’s, India appeared 
as both an alternative ally and economic opportunity. As a result, MITI and Keidanren began 
involvement in pushing Japan’s presence in India, and by 1998 Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) was rising reaching its peak in 1997 with 531.5 million US dollars (Jaishankar, 2000). 
After a gap of over a decade where Japan-India relations were neglected, high-level visits 
were being conducted by MITI and SDF (Self Defence Forces of Japan) – however, this was 
short-lived with Pokhran II.  
The then ambassador to India, Hiroshi Hirabayashi noted ‘It (the test) was particularly 
perceived as a slap in the face by the Japanese people. To be frank, I was rudely shocked and 
betrayed by India, which I believe to be an anti-nuclear champion. Pokhran (II) tests chilled 
our relationship to a great extent’ (Hirabayashi, 2002). This quote shows the intimate and 
highly emotive relations India had with Japan. This sense of ‘betrayal’ was reflected in 
Tokyo’s actions following Pokhran II. There followed a ‘freeze’ in the bilateral relationship, 
as the Japanese government suspended political exchanges and economic assistance. 
Ambassador Hirabayashi was recalled back to Tokyo for consultations with Prime Minister 
Hashimoto. Furthermore, the Japanese Diet issued a statement that the tests were ‘acts of 
destruction of the global environmental destruction of ecosystem of constituting a threat to 
the survival of human beings’ (Pant, 2010). Below, I show how Pokhran II impacted on one 
specific domain of Indo-Japanese relations by focussing on the case study of climate change. 
Climate change brings together various complex issues: environmental protection, economic 
development, and nuclear energy, which make it a suitable case to examine the shifts in 
Tokyo’s perception of New Delhi.  
Climate Change and the Japan-India Relationship 
This chapter explores how the China prism and the nuclear lens influence Japan’s perception 
of, and behaviour towards, India in the issue area of climate change. More specifically, I 
examine Japan’s conduct with respect to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which 
has run from 2006 up to the present), and its pilot phase of Activities Implemented Jointly 
(AIJ), which ran from 1995 to 2006. These are both Kyoto Mechanisms that bring developed 
and developing countries into cooperative frameworks. A closer examination of CDM and 
AIJ shows how Tokyo moved to ‘punish’ New Delhi after Pokhran II. 
Before discussing Japan’s view of India in climate change, one requires an understanding of 
the decision-making apparatus for CDM/AIJ in Japan. Like many decision-making 
procedures, CDM/AIJ is agreed through negotiations involving a complex web of 
government and actors in environment and energy in both the host state and in Japan. 
CDM/AIJs are run by the MOFA in consultation with the UNFCCC, but the CDM/AIJ 
projects are more specially directed through the Kyoto Mechanism Platform, with the 
Ministry of Environment as the key liaison point.x The turf wars and bureaucratic structures 
of environmental policymaking in Japan is a complex topic, but one that will not be discussed 
in detail here. However, it is worth noting that decision-makers in CDM/AIJ in Japan are 
energy, environment and business/commerce actors with grassroots involvement. The final 
negotiations are conducted by MOFA, but the ideas for the projects usually come from the 
bottom up, with a significant degree of input from energy actors. As a result, the CDM/AIJ 
project ordinarily reflects the interests of energy, environment, and/or business actors first, 
with input from MOFA at the very end stages.  
According to the total numbers of AIJ and CDM registered at the UNFCCC (Figure 1), it is 
apparent that China is placed ahead of India in the capacity as host country for these projects. 
In terms of Japanese activity in these mechanisms, three out of the five Japanese AIJs are 
located in China with no AIJ in India during the pilot phase, that is, up until 2006. Since the 
AIJ moved to the CDM phase after 2006, however, India has been able to secure some 
Japanese CDMs, but still lags behind China.  
 Figure 1: CDMs under UNFCCC by host country (Source: UNFCCC, 2014a).  
Figure 2 represents Japan’s CDMs, organised by host country. What becomes obvious is that 
China, with 455 projects of the total 821, is the recipient of over half of Japan’s CDMs. When 
one considers that China is the number one emitter of GHGs (23 per cent of global 
emissions), China’s Japanese CDM numbers may not come as a surprise. However, India is 
the third highest emitter of GHGs (7 per cent of global total), but only has 42 of Japan’s 
CDMs (Rogers, 2012). Both China and India are emerging powers with influence over the 
climate change regime. The two countries are also heavily reliant on fossil-fuels. What then 
explains this huge gap between Japanese CDMs in China and India?   
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 Figure 2: Japanese CDMs by host country (Source: Japan CDM Platform, 2012)   
Cooperative efforts towards climate change mitigation under the UNFCCC are split between 
the developed (Annex I) countries and developing (non-Annex I) countries. The Annex I 
countries are developing countries who, under the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibility’, have emissions caps. India and China are both non-Annex I countries, and do 
not have emissions caps under the Kyoto Protocol. The two share many similarities: both are 
population giants with large emissions, and their economic development relies heavily on 
coal. They also both harbour anti-colonial sentiments that are amplified by the UNFCCC’s 
division between the Global North and South. At the 15th Conference of Parties (COP) to the 
UNFCCC in Copenhagen (2009), countries gathered together to negotiate a second stage for 
the ‘Kyoto Protocol’.xi According to analysts at the Conference, India, together with China, 
‘wrecked the negotiations’ as leaders of the BASIC group of rising powers (Lynas, 2009). 
Thus, both countries are frequently linked through their shared image as obstructionist actors 
in climate change. 
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Japan has been one of the leaders in the UNFCCC and takes a proactive stance on emissions 
cuts. Prior to Copenhagen, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) raised its pledge for 
emissions cuts from eight per cent, a figure determined during the Liberal Democratic Party 
of Japan (LDP) leadership, to 25 per cent by the year 2020 from 1990 levels.xii Considering 
that Japan is the sixth largest emitter of GHGs, the Japanese policy is quite ambitious and 
signals its resolve to combat global warming.xiii India, on the other hand, has the second 
largest population in the world and is currently a medium development level country 
according to the UN Human Development Index (UNDP, 2014). In terms of climate change, 
India is the third largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHG), and is heavily reliant on coal, 
one of the major causes of GHG, so the future development trajectory for the country is of 
concern. 
Japan fought hard at the international negotiations to seek India and China’s acceptance of 
emissions caps for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Japan and India’s 
prime ministers met at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in 2009 
to agree to work together in ‘a positive and constructive’ manner on the issue of climate 
change issue (Tuteja, 2009). Although there is mutual respect for each other’s positions on 
climate change, the different developmental stages of India and Japan, which make the two 
economies complementary, also complicate cooperation on climate change mitigation. 
However, the CDM/AIJ bridges these kinds of differences, allowing Annex I countries (for 
example, Japan), to reach their emissions cuts by counting the emissions reductions of the 
projects that Annex I countries implement in non-Annex I countries (for example, India). 
Japan is one of the leading countries in climate abatement technology and one of the most 
active countries in the CDM/AIJ. 
Out of the non-Annex I countries available for Japan to cooperate under the CDM/AIJ, India 
was democratic, English-speaking and relatively transparent and was thus perceived as a 
‘better partner’ (1995-1998).xiv In comparison, the other big emitter in the non-Annex I 
group, China, was seen as autocratic, non-transparent and a difficult partner. However after 
India’s nuclear tests in 1998, the status of India and China switched. China was then seen as 
the ‘better partner’, attracting more numbers of Japanese AIJs and CDMs than India. 
Below I argue that Japan’s view of India rests on two factors: the historical ‘China prism’, 
and the ‘nuclear lens.’ However, it is also important to note that Tokyo’s perceptions are not 
formed in a vacuum but incorporate a range of calculations regarding the hegemonic powers 
of the Asia-Pacific – the US and rising China, and also in the context of economic 
considerations. 
The ‘China Prism’ in Indo-Japanese Cooperation on Climate Change 
According to Wataru Nishigahiro, former Deputy Chief of Mission for the Japanese Embassy 
in India: ‘the relationship with India is important, partly because of the factor of emerging 
China. We are not confronting China, but we have to manage the relationship with China 
carefully. And in that process, our relationship with India becomes more meaningful’ (Tuke, 
2011). Following the end of the Cold War, the rise of China, UN reform, maritime security, 
counter terrorism and environment were issues that brought India and Japan together. This 
allowed India to be Japan’s preferred partner prior to Pokhran II. There were already 
discussions between the security communities in India and Japan about holding joint naval 
exercises (the predecessors to the Malabar exercises) as early as 1997/98. However, the 
nuclear tests alarmed the Japanese, worsening Indo-Japanese relations, so the joint exercises 
were shelved until mid-2000.  
According to a MOFA official, Tokyo had perhaps ‘punished India too much after Pokhran 
II’ (Author interview, 2009). From this statement, he was referring to the lack of Japanese 
CDM projects in India. The CDM received a lukewarm reception when it was introduced in 
the 1990s, with India and China reacting particularly cautiously (Kobayashi, 2003). However, 
by the late 1990s, it was seen by developing countries as an effective means to absorb climate 
change abatement technologies, and the discussion in the South had then became one of how 
to ‘best attract CDM projects’ (Ibid.). Since China and India were the ‘big two’ in climate 
change emissions, the CDMs in these countries were seen as key to the success of the 
UNFCCC. However, Figures 1 and 2, above, indicate that India is very behind China and 
lacks ‘attractive power’ for CDMs. The magnitude of China’s emissions may explain China’s 
numbers to a certain extent, but India is not far behind China in terms of importance in GHG 
emissions. This indicates that there are factors other than GHG emissions that explain India’s 
low CDM project numbers. 
CDM projects often address energy efficiency, meaning other externalities, such as China’s 
trans-boundary pollution, acid rain or 2.5 particulates, which are of great importance to 
Japan, can also be addressed. The high number of Chinese CDMs can be explained by these 
externalities, however, 2.5 particulates were less of an issue in the early 2000s. In terms of 
Japanese CDMs, there was a conscious decision to ‘punish’ India after its Pokhran II tests by 
not rewarding it with CDMs. The dates of the CDM projects in India indicate this is a trend 
with numbers gradually recovering in the mid-2000s, concurrently with an improvement of 
Indo-Japanese relations.  
The gap between China and India’s numbers of Japanese CDMs becomes clear when viewed 
through Japan’s ‘nuclear lens’, as I argue below. The ‘China prism’ is however useful in 
understanding Indo-Japanese relations in the historical past, and is also relevant today, as I 
have shown. Tokyo makes its decisions on climate change vis-à-vis India in relation to its 
China policies, which are not unique to Japan, since China and India are both heavyweights 
in climate change negotiations. However, the ‘China prism’s’ influence over decision-making 
in Tokyo is a factor that should be taken into consideration. 
The ‘Nuclear lens’ in Indo-Japanese Cooperation on Climate Change  
After Pokhran II, the status of India and China switched: China was then viewed as the 
‘better partner, attracting more numbers of Japanese AIJs and CDMs than India. Japan’s view 
of India in climate change is assessed in reference to China.  
The Pokhran II tests shocked the global community and many countries were quick to react. 
This impact was visible in India’s relations with the US and the EU, not only with Japan. 
Australian and European aid was cut, but these cuts were minimal in comparison to American 
and Japanese aid to India. Although Japan’s nuclear identity is not something that is legally 
binding, the US on the contrary has a domestic law – the 1994 ‘Glenn Amendment’ – which 
stipulates that the US impose economic sanctions (including bilateral aid, credit and loan 
guarantees for US firms, and multilateral credit agencies, IMF and World bank) on any 
country engaging in nuclear testing (Ghosh, 1998).xv US, Japan and many European countries 
(excluding UK and France) suspended bilateral aid, which was equivalent to 3 billion US 
dollars (Ibid). In June 1998, Tokyo also refused to play host for a very important venue for 
discussion of Indian aid, the Aid India Consortium. No other country was willing to step in as 
host after Tokyo’s refusal (Ibid.). 
Prior to 1998, India had received an excess of 1.5 billion US dollars from Japan on an annual 
basis (Ghosh, 1998). After Pokhran II, there was a cutback of roughly 1 billion US dollars of 
Japanese bilateral aid (except for emergency, humanitarian and grassroots assistance) that 
lasted approximately three years. This also impacted future aid proposals and Tokyo backed 
down from hosting the India Developmental Forum. Furthermore, there was a cautious 
examination of technological transfer, resulting in stricter control (Jaishankar, 2000). 
The official response also permeated the cultural arena with exchange between India and 
Japan being suspended. The Empress Michiko of Japan was due to be given the keynote 
speech at the International Board on Books for Young People World Congress in New Delhi 
in September 1998, but cancelled after Pokhran II in May 1998. Instead a recorded speech 
was delivered as a video message (Roy, 2013). 
Japan together with the G7 and non-G7 countries opposed lending by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to India. 
As WB loans are spread over four to eight years; the impact of 1998 cannot be visibly traced. 
However, the WB postponed a decision to approve 865 million US dollars in project aid after 
Pokhran II (Sanger, 1998). This action was under the leadership of the Japanese, but the US 
and EU, who are on the board of WB board of directors, played a central role in this decision.  
Japan led the G8 Summit at Birmingham in 1998 to send a clear message against India’s 
nuclear tests. At the G8 Summit, Japan rounded up support for a statement condemning 
India’s tests as an ‘intolerable challenge to international society’ (Jaishankar, 2000).  
Subsequently, the South Asia Task Force was setup to coordinate pressure to cease nuclear 
tests on India and Pakistan, and Japan took leadership of this group (Ibid.). 
In the UN Security Council, Japan coordinated with Sweden, Costa Rice and Slovenia to pass 
UNSC Resolution 1172 which ‘demanded that those countries refrain from further nuclear 
tests and urged them to become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) and to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), without delay 
and without conditions (UNSC, 1998). At the P5 foreign ministers’ meeting in Geneva, Japan 
also issued an appeal not to grant India and Pakistan nuclear weapon state status. Although a 
failure, Japan in its desire to punish India also tried to induct Pakistan into the ASEAN 
regional forum (ARF) (Jaishankar, 2000).  
As the Indian economy has been growing at a very high rate, it is difficult to assess the 
impact of the sanctions imposed on India after Pokhran II. However, according Morrow and 
Carriere, it is apparent that FDI suffered a direct impact after May 1998. This impact was also 
felt in the credit ratings as the condemnations of various governments had a direct influence 
on India’s performance in these ratings (Morrow and Carriere, 1999). 
The impact of Pokhran II was also visible in climate change, as I have shown above. Japan 
also made clear that the country’s position was not negotiable for nuclear issues.  After 1998, 
India was replaced by China as the ‘better partner’ for CDMs, and as a result India never 
caught up in the race to attract CDM projects.  CDM was no longer only a means for Japan to 
meet its emissions cuts, but was an important means for developing countries such as India 
and China to access emissions abatement technologies – missing out on these projects was 
detrimental for India, and was something that India never recovered from, even after Indo-
Japanese relations improved later in the mid-2000s.  
Post-Pokhran II Indo-Japanese relations 
The post-Pokhran II sanctions placed upon India were revoked in October 2001, after India 
announced a moratorium on tests, and after 9/11 when terrorism took priority in international 
affairs.xvi Japan’s Prime Minister Mori made a visit to India in August 2000, where together 
with Prime Minister Vajpayee, declared the Indo-Japanese relationship a ‘global partnership’. 
By 2006, Indo-Japanese relations had improved, with annual Prime Ministerial talks 
resuming, and the issue of a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (Panda, 2012).xvii By 
2008, the two countries had referred to each other as ‘Strategic Global Partners’ in the ‘2008 
Joint Statement on the Advancement of Strategic and Global Partnership between Japan and 
India’ (MOFA, 2006). The 2008 ‘Security Accord’ is a framework agreement with ‘an action 
plan on specific measures to advance security cooperation in particular areas, ranging from 
sea-lane safety and defence collaboration to disaster management and counterterrorism’ 
(Chellaney, 2008). For Japan, this kind of close partnership is only otherwise seen with the 
United States.    
On the economic front, by the mid-2000s, India was viewed to be on par with China as an 
economic opportunity (Mathur, 2012). At the ASEAN Summit 2009, India also pledged to 
cut carbon intensity by 25 per cent by 2020 compared to 2005 levels, indicating a proactive 
stance in GHG mitigation.  It would appear that by mid-2000, many of the obstacles 
impeding Indo-Japanese cooperation were mostly out of the way. 
In these circumstances, how does Tokyo view New Delhi? Both India and Japan worry about 
the rise of China, the string of pearls, and SLOC. Moreover, various other factors such as 
China’s export of nuclear technology to Pakistan and the continuing Indo-Sino border 
disputes create friction between China and India that should bring India and Japan closer 
together. Japan has faced its own share of difficulties in its relationship to China, with a surge 
of anti-Japanese protests in the 2000s and the recent escalation of territorial disputes. These 
factors, compounded by the issues related to US bases in Okinawa, made Japan distance itself 
from the United States and look towards Asia. This move is encapsulated in Prime Minister 
Hatoyama’s (Japan Democratic Party DPJ) ‘Datsu-Bei Nyu-A Policy (2009), literally 
meaning ‘Leave the US and Enter into Asia Policy’. From a strategic standpoint, these same 
forces conspired to push India and Japan together (Ali, 2007). For example, Abe’s visit to 
India in 2007, with a token emphasis on overlapping strategic interests, helped result in an 
invitation from the host nation to participate in the Malabar 2007 naval exercise. Here, the 
Indian Navy and Japanese Self-Defence force, together with US, Australian and Singaporean 
forces participated in non-conventional maritime operations for the first time outside the 
Indian Ocean, off the Japanese Island of Okinawa.xviii It would seem that via the China prism, 
India was looking more attractive as a partner.  
The dates for increased CDM activity with India begin in 2005, pick up in 2007 and 
gradually grow from then on (Japan CDM Platform, 2012). According to Deputy Head of 
Mission to India, Nishigahiro, relations improved in 2004 (Nishigahiro, 2004). However, the 
number of Japanese CDMs in India has yet to equal the country’s importance in climate 
change. When we compare Figure 1 and 2, as opposed to the case of Japanese CDMs in India 
(Figure 2: 5.48 per cent), we see that the total number of CDMs in India (Figure 1: 19.8 per 
cent) have grown, showing that, when we total all of the Annex I countries, their CDM 
activities in India reflect the country’s importance in the issue. When one considers that 
China is also a nuclear power, the Japanese response in CDM after Pokhran II appears to 
have been too strict towards India. This could be explained by the differences in China and 
India’s position on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Japanese 
decision makers’ comments above (Hirabayashi and Nishigahiro) indicate the highly intimate 
nature of Indo-Japanese relations, and suggest that foreign policy-making may have 
emotional attributes and not be an entirely rational enterprise.      
Nuclear issues still play a role in Indo-Japanese relations with Japan again putting pressure on 
India to sign the CTBT during Prime Minister Hotoyama’s visit to India in 2009 (PTI, 2009). 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh responded by stating that ‘should the US and China ratify 
the CTBT, a new situation will emerge’, placing the onus back on to the US and China. This 
incident indicates that Indo-Japanese relations are heavily influenced by each country’s 
relations with the US and China respectively. Japan is increasingly sensitive to nuclear issues 
after the Fukushima disaster of November 2011, with the result that nuclear issues now 
matter even more in Tokyo foreign policy. This is one of the reasons for the delay in the 
Indo-Japan civilian nuclear cooperation deal, and also explains why Japans CDMs in India 
have not increased to mirror India’s importance in GHGs.xix 
Conclusion  
This chapter has sought to understand some of the factors that impact upon Japan’s 
perception of India within the domain of environmental foreign policy. Japan has historically 
viewed India through the ‘prism’ of China, and this convenient prism makes India issues both 
easier for Tokyo to relate to and puts the Indo-Japanese relationship in the context of wider 
Asia-Pacific relations. The nuclear issue is one that impacts Tokyo in its foreign policy, 
especially in the context of India. The specific example of climate change and CDM/AIJ 
projects gives an indication of how much this nuclear lens and the China prism play into 
Tokyo’s decision-making, with Pokhran II as a turning point in Indo-Japanese relations. 
Several years later, the bilateral relationship is in recovery, but, at least as far as cooperation 
through the CDM is concerned, there is still some way to go. China and nuclear politics 
remains a central reference point in Indo-Japan relations.  
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Notes 
                                                
i For details of the importance of Hormuz and Malacca see U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (2012).  
ii Also known as Okakura Tenshin, a Japanese scholar who spread Japanese art and culture 
and wrote the book The Book of Tea (Tenshin, 1906).  
iii Nehru writing in a letter to Indira Gandhi, ‘So Japan had won, and she entered the charmed 
circle of the great Powers… Japan’s victory was seen to be due to her adoption of the new 
industrial methods of the West, and these ideas and methods became more popular all over 
the East’ (Nehru, 1964, p.479). 
                                                                                                                                                  
iv According to the survey, 80 per cent of the surveyed Indians saw India-Japan relations as 
positive. 
v Both Netaji and Rash Behari Bose spent a period of exile in Japan. Subhas Chandra 
Bose (1897–1945) was in Japan from 1943–45, and Rash Behari Bose (1886–1945) fled to 
Japan in 1915, became a Japanese citizen 1923 and spent the rest of his life there. Rash 
Behari Bose married the daughter of Nakamuraya (a restaurant in Tokyo), and later became 
known as Nakamuraya’s Bose, and introduced ‘curry-rice’ to Japan.  
vi The San Francisco Peace Treaty, or Treaty of Peace with Japan was signed in 1951 and 
came into force in 1952. The Treaty of Peace between Japan and India was signed on 9 June 
1952. 
vii Nehru wrote to Tokyo, ‘I hope that when the children of India and the children of Japan 
will grow up, they will serve not only their great countries, but also the cause of peace and 
cooperation all over Asia and the world. So you must look upon this elephant, Indira by 
name, as a messenger of affection and goodwill from the children of India’ (The Japan 
Forum, 2007).  
viii Many of the ancient Buddhist texts were translated into Japanese from Chinese translations 
of the Sanskrit originals. Another example is Benzaiten a deity in Japanese Buddhism holding 
a biwa (Japanese) or pipa (Chinese). Her iconography derives from that of the Hindu deity 
Sarasvatī, who is traditionally depicted holding a vīnā: both represent knowledge, music, arts 
and science. 
ix See Dower (1995, p.281) for a discussion on ‘Victim Consciousness’ (hibakusha ishiki). 
                                                                                                                                                  
x For further details, refer to the UNFCCC website (UNFCCC, 2014b). For more 
comprehensive information on CDM in Japan see the Japan CDM Platform website (Japan 
CDM Platform , 2012), where Ministry of Economic Trade and Industry, NEDO, IGES, 
JICA, JETRO Japan Bank for International Cooperation, Global Environment Centre 
Foundation (GEC), JCF, Nippon Export and Investment Insurance, OECC are also involved.  
xi The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol was 2008–2012, and the second 
commitment period is 2013–2020.  
xii This promise was later withdrawn. Prior to Fukushima, nuclear energy comprised one third 
of Japan’s energy. As a result, the pledge made at Warsaw (COP19 in 2013) was to cut its 
emissions by 3.8 per cent, based on 2005 levels (Hance, 2013). 
xiii After China, USA, India, Russia, and Brazil. 
xiv The pilot phase (AIJ) began in 1995, so between 1995 until Pokhran II in 1998, India was 
the preferred partner.  
xv Although Japan takes the ‘three nuclear principles’ and forbids them in the Constitution, 
the imposition of sanctions are not reflected in legislation.    
xvi US lifted sanctions after 9 September 2001 when terrorism became a bigger evil than 
challenges to the non-proliferation regime, and other countries soon followed the US lead.  
xvii  India and Japan have annual foreign office consultations at Foreign Secretary level, and 
also a Security Dialogue between high level defence authorities since 2001. 
                                                                                                                                                  
xviii  Includes anti-piracy operations, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief 
and counterterrorism.  
xix India and Japan are close to a civil nuclear agreement but several things are holding the 
finalization of the agreement (Mehdudia, 2013).  
